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Lacking an operational theory to explain the organization and behaviour of matter in unicellular and multicellular
organisms hinders progress in biology. Such a theory should address life cycles from ontogenesis to death. This theory
would complement the theory of evolution that addresses phylogenesis, and would posit theoretical extensions to
accepted physical principles and default states in order to grasp the living state of matter and define proper biological
observables. Thus, we favour adopting the default state implicit in Darwin’s theory, namely, cell proliferation with
variation plus motility, and a framing principle, namely, life phenomena manifest themselves as non-identical
iterations of morphogenetic processes. From this perspective, organisms become a consequence of the inherent
variability generated by proliferation, motility and self-organization. Morphogenesis would then be the result of the
default state plus physical constraints, like gravity, and those present in living organisms, like muscular tension.
[Longo G, Montévil M, Sonnenschein C and Soto AM 2015 In search of principles for a Theory of Organisms. J. Biosci.] DOI 10.1007/s12038-
015-9574-9
Whether you can or cannot observe a thing depends on
the theory which you use. It is the theory which decides
what can be observed.
– Einstein, oral remark quoted in Salam (1990)
1. Motivation
Biologists acknowledge a crisis in their midst: On the one hand,
reams of data acquired from a reductionist perspective (for
example, ‘transcriptomics’) do not provide the anticipated un-
derstanding of the subject matter of their interest; on the other
hand, the application of mathematical modeling has not helped
much either. This is due in part to the preponderance of ‘prag-
matic systems biology,’ a practice that emphasizes large-scale
molecular interactions which is technology-driven and does not
claim explicit theory commitments (O’Malley andDupre 2005).
Fifty years ago the notions of program, information and
signal borrowed frommathematical theories seemed to resolve
the differences between physics and biology made explicit by
Kant: teleology, now under the guise of a program, became
acceptable to reductionists who claimed that biology could be
reduced to physics and chemistry (Jacob 1974). However, the
notions of program, information and signal borrowed from the
mathematical theories of information have been hindering
progress in biology (Longo et al. 2012a). These notions re-
quire searching for biological specificity at the molecular level
which is not coherent with that of biomechanics, another
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important contributor to phenotypes. Yet biomechanics be-
came prominent in several biological fields including cancer
research. Indeed, tumours are palpable, a fact obviously related
to their being more rigid than the surrounding normal tissue.
Thus, technical knowhow is being introduced together with
new operational definitions which may not be coherent with
the ones already in use.1
The above-referred practice contributes to the feeling that
biological complexity is unfathomable and that generaliza-
tions and global concepts are unhelpful.2 Thus, the theoret-
ical bases underlying the experimental programs being
pursued remain only implicit. Meanwhile, the explosion of
data continues unabated having neither sound theoretical
bases nor an adequate language to make sense of them.
While acknowledging the immense complexity of organ-
isms, we dare to think that what Darwin achieved for evolu-
tion could eventually materialize for ontogenesis: this will be
achieved through the elaboration of an appropriate theoreti-
cal framework.
2. The role of theories
At the beginning of the Scientific Revolution, scientists
thought that they had direct access to their outside world:
God’s will was to make nature intelligible to creatures like
us. The separation of science and religion was a long and
complex process: Kant’s philosophy and Darwin’s theory
were major contributors to this separation. Ever since, sci-
entists acknowledge that they are inside the world they wish
to observe and study. As a result of this realization, objec-
tivity had to be constructed through scientific theories that
would provide intelligibility principles to frame observa-
tions, experiments and explanations. In the 16th and 17th
centuries, physicists developed theories that provided an
accurate description of phenomena of the inert. In this
theory-rich context, scientists were aware that theories de-
termine which are the proper observables while, conversely,
the choice of observables was a major theoretical commit-
ment. For example, the decision to investigate the relation-
ship between pressure, volume and temperature well before
considering the atomic structure of gases (17th century,
Boyle and Mariotte), allowed for the development of a
theory at that level of observability. Further work at the
macroscopic level originated modern thermodynamics
(TD), another major achievement of the 19th century; this
was well before Boltzmann’s unification with an atomistic
perspective. Notwithstanding, atoms and molecules are
proper observables in another physical theory, quantum me-
chanics (QM).
When living entities die, they decompose into particles of
inert matter, and in turn, living organisms assemble the same
inert matter in novel ways. The emergence of these novelties
requires suitable theoretical constructs (Longo and Montévil
2012; Longo and Montévil 2014; Saçlioglu et al. 2014). That
is, besides the already acknowledged physical principles and
default states, additional principles and theoretical require-
ments are needed to describe proper biological observables,
such as phenotypes. These extensions of physical laws into
biology must be compatible with physical theory about inert
matter, i.e. organisms should not violate the laws of thermo-
dynamics, gravity or the quantum properties of their compo-
nent particles. Yet, these principles may not suffice to make
the biological dynamics intelligible at the phenotypic level.
In biology, other than Darwin’s theory of evolution
(1859), the creation of global theories has not been as suc-
cessful as in physics (Soto and Sonnenschein 2012). Among
other subjects, Darwin’s theory on the origin of species
addressed common descent, encompassed a long time-
frame and provided an adequate explanation of phylogeny.
The fundamental principles in Darwin’s theory are (a) de-
scent with modification and (b) natural selection. However,
biology has yet to produce a theory of organisms that would
encompass ontogeny and life cycles, i.e. phenomena occur-
ring on a time-scale going from conception to death (Elsasser
1987). Recently, several worthy contributions have been
made in this area (Kupiec 2010; Deacon 2012; Newman
2012; Davies 2013). Approaches based exclusively on
stochasticity and natural selection like the ontophylogenesis
theory (Kupiec 2010) provide new perspectives; however,
they are insufficient to frame a theory of organisms because
the molecular events at the core of the ontophylogenesis
theory are causally dependent on cell, tissue and organismal
contexts and these contexts are not addressed by this
approach.
Since the 1970s, the thermodynamics of dissipative sys-
tems provided an opportunity to examine the relevance of
self-organizing physical systems to the understanding of the
emergence of life, as exemplified by the pioneering work of
Prigogine and his school (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977),
Kauffman (Kauffman 1993) and others. For instance,
Cottrell elegantly highlighted the role of thermodynamics
while stressing the need for a biological perspective that
would bring to this analysis distinctive biological character-
istics such as historicity and purposiveness (Cottrell 1979).
1 In operationalism, scientific terms are defined by the experimental
operations which determine their applicability. For example, epidermal
growth factor is a misnomer because it does not induce proliferation.
However, it induces cell spreading in one assay: when cells spread, the
circumference of the colony is longer, and as only the cells in the
periphery proliferate, EGF in this assay seems to increase cell number.
When given in vivo, it induces early eye opening, a process character-
ized by cell death. So, in one operational definition it increases cell
number, in the other, it increases cell death.
2 For example, some biologists believe that there are exceptions to
every rule, and that there are no valid ‘principles’, ‘rules’ or overarching
concepts.
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Unfortunately, despite these promising beginnings, the de-
velopment of a theory of organisms has been hindered by the
misuse of metaphors borrowed from theories of information
(Longo et al. 2012a). To remedy this situation, we are
proposing instead explicit principles for the elaboration of
a theory of organisms that would make such a theory robust,
and open to change when challenged by empirical evidence.
Our analysis purposefully refers to physics, not only
because biological theory should not violate physical laws,
but also because there is a tradition in organismal biology to
use both the similarities and differences between these dis-
ciplines to advance biological knowledge. For example,
Helmholtz improved the understanding of both the physiol-
ogy of nerve conduction and muscle metabolism while de-
veloping the principle of conservation of energy in physics
(Lenoir 1982). An additional example is the current wave of
physicists and mathematicians entering the field of Systems
Biology while carrying with them the theoretical framework
of physics.3 Most importantly, biology may make it possible
to identify a new physical principle (Moore 2012). There-
fore, before stating the proposed principles for a theory of
organisms, we will elaborate on some relevant relationships
between physics and biology (table 1).
3. From physics to biology
3.1 The impact of physics on biology
First, we will go over the fundamental role that symmetries
and conservation principles play in physical theories, in
particular by defining the default state. Then, we will discuss
the appearance of new observables, which is related to the
concept of emergence, and how these concepts relate to
symmetries and conservation principles. We will then posit
that biology is characterized by a relentless breaking of
symmetries, and propose a theoretical bridge between phys-
ics and biology which we are calling extended criticality.
Extended criticality provides the theoretical frame for a non-
conservative default state. The latter entails an intrinsic
source of variation, which is a necessary concept in evolu-
tionary biology together with a principle of non-identical
iteration of morphogenetic processes.
3.2 Default states and symmetries in physics
Since Galileo and Descartes, physicists made the default
state of inert matter explicit: this is inertia, an instance of
fundamental conservation laws.4 Briefly, if no cause (force)
modifies the properties of an object, the object conserves its
properties.5 In short, a default state is what happens when
nothing is done to the object in question. Three centuries
later, E Noether’s theorems provided a deeper understanding
for this default state by mathematically justifying conserva-
tion properties of energy and momenta in terms of symme-
tries in the state equations (van Fraassen 1989). Ever since,
symmetries (and their breaking) acquired an even more
fundamental role in physics (table 1). We are referring to
the notion of ‘symmetries’ in the broad sense given to it by
modern physics, as transformations preserving the key in-
variants observed and proposed by the intended theory. For
example, Noether’s theorem enables us to understand the
conservation of energy and momentum on the basis of time
and space symmetries of fundamental equations, respective-
ly. In short, the conservation of these quantities is grounded
on the idea that the ‘laws’ of physics are the same at different
positions and times. However, the notion of symmetries is as
old as Archimedes’ principles as exemplified by the lack of
movement of a scale with equal and symmetric weights on
each arm. Moreover, physicists have proposed the existence
of a particle for symmetry reasons; the existence of anti-
matter was proposed this way. In biology, instead, the types
of symmetries usually referred to are a subset within the
broad category of symmetries in mathematics; for example,
symmetry with respect to an axis on a plane. They represent
specific and simple cases of transformation (a space rotation,
for example) preserving the properties of the geometric
structure under examination.
3.3 Emergence in physics and in biology
The construction of theories in physics relies on mathemat-
ical symmetries. There is no obvious continuity between
theories when they are based on different symmetries. For
example, in classical mechanics there is no time arrow (phe-
nomena are reversible) whereas in thermodynamics, like in
biology, time is oriented (phenomena are irreversible)6
(table 1).
3 However, applying existing physical theories directly to biology
might be misleading. For example, in numerous studies the use of the
concepts of energy and temperature stems from a fruitful mathematical
analogy with statistical mechanics. However, the analog of temperature
and energy in models of interacting birds in a flock is not and cannot be
expressed in the proper physical units (Joules for energy and Kelvin for
temperature); as a result, these applications lack a theoretical justifica-
tion for this energy to be conservative which is a crucial invariant
property for statistical physics. A specific example of why any scientific
theory developed within a specific domain cannot be directly applied to
another domain is given in Longo et al. (2012a) about the application of
the concept of information in biology.
4 Inertia was first introduced by Kepler, but with a different meaning:
the default state was rest (quiescence), and thus, it could not explain
why a planet keeps orbit without being pushed by some agency.
5 In the context of Galilean relativity, speeds are arbitrary or relative,
and entail a change in position; therefore, position cannot be conserved.
The speed of an isolated object is conserved.
6 For example, irreversibility means that we can tell when a movie is
being played forward or backward.
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Emergence is the appearance of a new observable that
cannot be derived from the root theory. The transition from
water molecules to a liquid is a relevant example of emergence
of new properties, such as fluidity and incompressibility.
These novelties force a radical change of mathematical sym-
metries and thus of theories fromQM to hydrodynamics (HD).
Similarly, at its inception, TD disregarded gas particles and
their classical trajectories, and focused instead on macroscopic
observables, such as temperature, volume and pressure. Later
on, Boltzmann unified TD to the Newton–Laplace theory of
trajectories of gas particles by adding the hypothesis of ‘mo-
lecular chaos’, a strong, limit property, based on a fundamental
symmetry.7 As a result, the theoretical symmetries were totally
changed. For example, time becomes irreversible (table 1). In
both cases a new unifying theory, including theoretical sym-
metry changes, is needed. Recapitulating, in physics a theory is
ruled by its mathematical symmetries, which in turn determine
its proper observables (table 1). Conversely, the appearance of
new observables forces a change of theory.
A biological example of emergent phenomena is the
advent of novelties such as ears and hearing which evolved
from the double jaw bones of some vertebrates. These evo-
lutionary processes imply a change of observables and, thus,
of theoretical symmetries (Longo and Montévil 2014). In the
previous examples from physics, changes of observables and
symmetries required a change of theory. In contrast, Darwin
proposed a global theory of evolutionary dynamics, one with
little mathematics and with no explicit theoretical symme-
tries, yet based on principles that allow us to understand
changes like the generation of new organs and functions8
and of new phenotypes. Implicitly, Darwin’s is a theory
about symmetry changes; that is, a theory of the changes of
biological organization along phylogenesis. Symmetry
changes are also relevant for ontogenesis, as exemplified
from the generation of a metazoa from a single cell. We thus
propose principles for a theory of organisms in which sym-
metry changes are incessant, and occur in an ‘extended
critical interval’ (Bailly and Longo 2011; Longo and
Montévil 2014) (see below). Unification between ontogene-
sis, and phylogenesis will require a closer examination of
criticality.
3.4 From criticality to extended criticality
In the 1980s, theoretical biologists became interested in the
physics of criticality where symmetry breaking is a central
concept (Bak and Sneppen 1993; Kauffman 1993). More-
over, along critical transitions, the ‘local structure’ is corre-
lated to the ‘global’ one, a phenomenon which echoes the
coherence of organisms. Typically, at critical transitions,
correlation lengths9 tend to infinity and the very object of
investigation changes, say, from vapour to a snowflake. This
transition happens at a point which marks the passage from
one object to another and from one symmetry to another.
Within a given theoretical framework, renormalization
methods allow the representation of the critical transition to
a ‘new object’ by a class of models parameterized by the
scale10 (table 1). In biology, various phenomena are
analysed explicitly as critical transitions in the physical
sense, such as the formation of a coherent depolarization of
thousands of mitochondria inside cardiomyocytes (Aon et al.
2004), the critical dynamics of the transcriptome (Nykter
et al. 2008) and the coherent activities of neurons (Werner
2007) (see Longo and Montévil (2014) and Mora and Bialek
(2011) for additional examples).
From the view point of extended critical transitions an
organism is understood as being in a permanent transition
with all the main signatures of criticality, such as changes of
symmetries, the constant reconstruction of correlation
lengths and the formation of a new global structure (Bailly
and Longo 2011; Longo and Montévil 2014) (table 1). Thus,
phylogenetic and ontogenetic trajectories involve ‘cascades
of symmetry changes’ which contribute to the historicity of
phylogeny and ontogeny by generating biological variability
and anatomical and functional diversity (Longo et al. 2012b;
Longo and Montévil 2014). This is the first of the points we
wish to make regarding the unity of these two theories
addressing life at different time-scales.
The theory of critical phase transitions is relevant to our
proposal because this theory is concerned with the formation
of new objects and symmetries at and beyond the critical
transition point (figure 1). Here emergence of a new object is
mathematically treated as a point-wise transition at the crit-
ical point (Longo and Montévil 2014). Extended critical
transitions, instead, span a non-trivial interval such as an
organism’s lifetime. In this context, an organism continually
undergoes critical transitions, whereby both the objects and
the symmetries change. The organism and its components
are permanently reconstructed with variations.11 This repre-
sents a sharp departure from physics where a radical change
of symmetry implies a change of theory. So far, only a single
7 More precisely, this unification uses the notion of ergodicity. The
ergodic hypothesis states that a particle spends time in regions of the
phase space of same energy proportionally to their volume, which is a
new symmetry of the phase-space.
8 We use a broad definition of function: the physiologic activity of an
organ or part.
9 Correlation length: distance at which different parts still influence
each other.
10 The renormalization methods provide refined mathematical tech-
niques to deal with the situation at a symmetry change (Lesne 1998).
11 This situation is very different from the physical notion which in-
volves a single point and a single symmetry change. At the mathemat-
ical limit, this may be viewed as a dense set of critical transitions in the
intended interval (Longo and Montévil 2014)
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transition like the one at the critical point can be accommo-
dated into a single theory. In summary, the passage from
theories of the inert to a theory of organisms must accom-
modate continual symmetry changes within one theoretical
frame. Extended criticality is an attempt in this direction.
3.5 Physical systems at equilibrium, far-from-equilibrium
and organisms
Physical systems at equilibrium are fully described by con-
servation properties and the associated equational symme-
tries. In contrast, far-from-equilibrium dissipative physical
systems like flames, micelles and Bénard cells12 are an
organization of flows of energy and/or matter. In a mathe-
matical sense, flows and boundary conditions fully deter-
mine and thus causally trigger and maintain the structure of
any such system (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977). Within this
theory, the quantity which allows the mathematical analysis
of the system is entropy production, that is, the energy
dispersal rate instead of energy conservation. This analysis
is based on a non-conservative quantity, i.e. entropy increase
associated to time irreversibility. When the flows of energy,
matter and entropy are constant, these systems are called
stationary. However, not all the mathematical symmetries
of equilibrium are still applicable. Instead, the balance equa-
tions of the flows provide more suitable tools for the analysis
of stationary systems than those equations of equilibrium
(Cottrell 1979; Nicolis and Prigogine 1977). In this instance,
physics approximates biology because there is no such thing
as an organism at thermodynamic equilibrium. Organisms
use flows but are not a consequence of flows (table 1). Next,
we further elaborate on this distinction.
Far-from-equilibrium physical systems are understood by the
analysis of their instantaneous flows. Indeed, the shape of a
flame can be calculated from the flows of energy and matter that
go through it, whereas the shape of an organism cannot. Far-
from-equilibrium systems are ahistorical13 because they appear
spontaneously and can be analysed independently. In contrast,
organisms are not spontaneous but historical, meaning that they
are a consequence of the reproductive activity of a pre-existing
organism. Organization cannot be deduced from flows operating
within and upon organisms; instead, understanding biological
organization requires a historical analysis. This perspective rein-
forces Dobzhansky’s assertion that ‘nothing in biology makes
sense except in the light of evolution’ given that evolution is
precisely historical. Historicity is thus the second point we stress
in this quest for unification between the theories of evolution and
of organisms.
In an organism, each cell division changes local symme-
tries because each of those divisions forces new local and
potentially global correlations. These changes yield variabil-
ity and adaptability to organisms. In the context of evolution,
the advent of new functions and organs are additional
Figure 1. This figure represents a simulation of a phase transition, which is a simple model of magnets: the Ising model. The system is a
grid where each location can be either 1 (white) or −1 (black). At high temperatures, the system is disordered, and is a uniform random mix
of black and white; as such its macroscopic description does not change if we swap black and white: it is symmetric and the global
magnetization is 0. At low temperatures, the system is magnetized, and is either dominated by black or white; the magnetization has become
a new relevant global observable and the symmetry is broken. At the critical point, the point of transition between these two states, the
system has a global behaviour with patterns at all scales.
12 Bénard cells are one of the simplest types of self-organization of
matter generated by natural convection: regular patterns of liquid move-
ment occur in a layer of fluid heated from below.
13 Because of their ahistoricity, self-organized far-from-equilibrium
physical systems are used as a paradigm for the origin of life, a subject
that is not addressed herein.
Giuseppe Longo et al.
J. Biosci.
examples of symmetry changes. In our approach, reproduc-
tion with modification involves ‘symmetry changes’ and
may be viewed as multiple critical transitions which span
the irreversible time of both phylogenesis and ontogenesis.
This is the third common point towards the unification of the
theories addressing these two different time-scales.
4. Foundations for a Theory of Organisms
We propose two founding principles: (1) the default
state of cells, meaning proliferation with variation and
motility, and (2) the framing principle of non-identical
iterations of a morphogenetic process. These principles
take place in the context of extended critical transitions.
4.1 The default state in biology: A nexus between the
theories of evolution and of organisms
In order to provide a theoretical transition between physics
and biology, we will define a default state which is a limit
case. Inertial movement as uniform rectilinear movement is a
limit state and physicists made all physical movements in-
telligible as departures from it. By describing this default
state, Galileo could focus on the analysis of the forces
constraining it, such as gravity and friction.
The ‘unconstrained’ condition proper to the biological
default state requires adequate physical conditions, such as
specific intervals of temperature, pressure and pH. Sufficient
nutrients provide a flow of energy and matter canalized
through metabolic processes. In these unrestrained, limit
conditions, cells constitutively exert their default state, i.e.
proliferation with variation plus motility (table 1). The de-
fault state should not be conflated with conditions necessary
for life. For example, metabolism is necessary for cells to be
alive given that metabolism happens regardless of whether
cells are proliferating or quiescent, moving or immobile
(‘metabolism happens, whatever happens’). In contrast, a
default state is what happens when nothing is done to the
object or system (‘a default state happens when nothing
happens to prevent it’). Consequently, the nature of what
can be done to the system is defined by the theory, like the
concept of force in classical mechanics; according to New-
ton’s first law force modifies (accelerates) inertial move-
ment. Thus, the analysis of the constraints to proliferation
with variation and motility is fundamental to the intelligibil-
ity of organismal biology. This is equivalent to the role of
Newton’s laws for understanding mechanics. It should be
remembered that Newton posed his laws ‘axiomatically,’ as
core principles of his theory.14
4.1.1 Proliferation with variation: Darwin explicitly stated
‘…There is no exception to the rule that every organic being
naturally increases at so high a rate, that, if not destroyed, the
earth would soon be covered by the progeny of a single pair’
(Darwin 1859). Reproduction obligatorily involves
‘modification’ (descent with modification, in Darwin’s
words). Reproduction with variation is intrinsic to
organisms regardless of whether they are unicellular or
multicellular (Sonnenschein and Soto 1999; Soto and
Sonnenschein 2011). Darwin’s narrative implies that
reproduction with variation is a default state and he
describes it as a limit case. This is the third, and probably
most important, point in common between the theories of
evolution and organisms.
The default state of proliferation applies to the first com-
mon ancestor, i.e. the cell from which all organisms arose
(figure 2). In fact, microbiologists consider axiomatic that
proliferation is the default state of prokaryotes and unicellu-
lar eukaryotes (Luria 1975). On the contrary, despite lacking
evidence, there had been a consensus among biologists that
consider quiescence as the default state of cells in multicel-
lular organisms (Alberts et al. 2008; Alberts 2010). We
posited, instead, that proliferation was retained as the default
state with the advent of metaphyta and metazoa. This con-
clusion is supported by the conservation of the cell cycle
components throughout eukaryotes (Sonnenschein and Soto
1999) and by exper imental evidence (Soto and
Sonnenschein 1985; Sonnenschein e t a l . 1996;
Sonnenschein and Soto 1999; Ying et al. 2008; Leitch
et al. 2010). Additionally, the default state of proliferation
has been adopted advantageously as a fundamental principle
in theories of carcinogenesis and of development
(Sonnenschein and Soto 1999; Soto and Sonnenschein
2010; Minelli 2011).
Variation (as in proliferation with variation) should be
understood as symmetry changes; each cell division gener-
ates variations that correspond to symmetry changes associ-
ated to critical transitions. How does intrinsic variation
manifest itself? One obvious example is the unequal distri-
bution of macromolecules and organelles during cell divi-
sion (Huh and Paulsson 2011); another is stochastic gene
expression (Kupiec 1983; Taniguchi et al. 2010; Tyagi 2010;
Marinov et al. 2014). Additional variation is due to somatic
mutations and aneuploidy, events described among cells of
normal mammalian kidneys and brains (Martin et al. 1996;
Rehen et al. 2001).
4.1.2 Motility: Motility encompasses intracellular, cellular,
tissue and organismic movements (Stebbings 2001). The
14 The term constraint has been used in various contexts. The concept
used herein is (i) constraint is something that remains invariant with
respect to the duration of the process being constrained, (ii) a constraint
changes the process being constrained (Montévil and Mossio 2015).
Additionally, like for the mechanical default state (inertia) a constraint
acts on the biological default state. In biological systems, constraints
enable the emergence of new processes and phenomena.
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evolution of the cytoskeleton protein actin, which is believed
to have been present in all early organisms, supports the
concept that motility, like proliferation with variation, is
the default state of all cells (Buss 1987; Sonnenschein and
Soto 1999). From chemotaxis to swimming, motility
immediately suggests the idea of agency.15 Agency has
dominated the debate on the differences between inert
and living matter for most of the 19th century. Motility
suggests a comparison with classical physics because both
involve trajectories in space. In physics, an external force
is required to obtain a change of inertial movement,
interpreted as a conservation property grounded on
theoretical symmetries. In contrast, a cell or an organism
will spontaneously move by using forces and flows of
energy and matter. Cells do not require external stimuli
to move. Movement along a direction represents a
symmetry change, and corresponds to a non-conservation
property as it is not inertial. Moreover, these actions are
accompanied by critical transitions ( Werner 2007;
Cardamone et al. 2011).
Motility should not exclude movements other than loco-
motion. Plants may be attached to the ground by their roots,
but they can generate movement of their parts, for example
by growing towards a source of light. Flowers and leaves
open and close in response to light (van Doorn and van
Meeteren 2003), and like animal cells, can move organelles
using actin and myosin (Ueda et al. 2010).
4.2 Default state and constraints
During early development, increases in the size of an organ-
ism occur by generation of new cells and production of
extracellular matrix. Cell proliferation is the result of the
default state and is constrained. Organ shape is a result of
the cells’ default state plus physical constraints, like gravity,
and those ones created by the living organism, like muscular
tension.
Inert matter requires causes to change states or properties.
The causal structure of a physical process is determined
mathematically by a set of equations justified by symmetries,
such as equilibria. For example, Newton’s equations relate
forces to their effects, i.e. as causes of acceleration at equi-
librium. In physics, causes and constraints on the default
state are synonymous. Organisms, instead, are agentive and
thus capable of initiating activity by themselves. The default
state is a cause in biology; by contrast, anything that affects
the default state is a constraint. For example, gravity be-
comes a constraint for evolution and embryogenesis, and not
a cause of biological dynamics. Gravity influences numerous
if not all biological processes and it is a main determinant of15 Agency is the ability to act, that is, to initiate an action.
Figure 2. The emergence of living organisms and their further evolution, as we know it, implies that the default state of the first cell (i.e.
‘THE CELL’) and those of their daughters must have been proliferation-with-variation and motility. The question mark indicates that the
process that generated THE CELL from a pre-biotic soup is unknown.
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morphogenesis as exemplified in the formation of the antero-
posterior axis in chick embryos. However, the formation of
this axis is not a consequence of gravity, but of the activity of
cells under the constraint of gravity: in our theoretical frame
and language, gravity is a constraint and not a cause. In sum,
biological dynamics is grounded on the default state, that is,
proliferation with variation and motility.
Constraints narrow down the range of ‘possibles’. For
example, fibroblasts removed from subcutaneous tissues of
an animal have the same size when dissociated and
explanted into a culture dish. Soon after, their size varies
over a wide range ( Rubin and Hatie 1968; Rubin 1988).
Constraints also enable other ‘possibles.’ The bottom of a
cell culture dish prevents displacement in that direction
reducing the possible movements, but at the same time this
constraint enables cells to crawl along a plastic surface. In a
multicellular organism, other constraints to the default state
are relevant. Mechanical constraints limit proliferation, var-
iation and motility, like when cells compress each other; they
adhere to other cells, and stretch each other. Fibers in the
extracellular matrix apply tensile forces on structures
allowing movement in certain directions and constraining it
in others (Barnes et al. 2014). Sequential smooth muscle
differentiation exerts compressive stress on the endoderm
and mesenchyme of the small intestine, causing buckling
and folding which leads to the formation of villi (Shyer
et al. 2013). Muscle contraction shapes the bones to which
they are attached by inducing tissue accrual on the side of
tension (Muller 2003; Rot-Nikcevic et al. 2007), and chem-
ical interactions may also constrain the default state, as when
serum albumin restricts proliferation of estrogen sensitive
cells, and estrogen cancels the action of this constraint
(Sonnenschein et al. 1996).
We posit that organisms do not have stable symmetries that
would allow us to spell out the actual phylogenetic and onto-
genetic trajectories that they follow because such trajectories
depend on the history and random changes of symmetries of
the objects considered, organisms in this case (Longo and
Montévil 2014). The default state of proliferation with varia-
tion corresponds to Darwin’s key idea of evolution being
‘descent with modification’, on which selection operates.
In contrast to physics where conservation principles frame
the theories, in biology, the default state of proliferation with
variation is a non-conservation principle (Longo et al.
2012b; Longo and Montévil 2013). This rationale does not
conflict with physical principles as it concerns new observ-
ables, i.e. phenotypes. In fact, proper principles and observ-
ables are being added at different and interacting levels of
biological organization and determination. Thus, the theory
of organisms that we envisage becomes a compatible exten-
sion of physical theories.
Finally, the recent phylogenetic history of every cell is the
proliferation of its parental cell. On a far longer temporal
scale unicellular ancestors of cells of multicellular organisms
are assumed to have had proliferation as their default state.
Thus, it is the shift from proliferation with variation and
motility to quiescence, which should be explained, instead of
being assumed. Cell proliferation is achieved by the execu-
tion of a cell cycle process, which does not stop until two
quite similar but non-identical cells are formed. The cell
cycle is a representation of enzymatic reactions and physical
processes leading to the duplication of the cell components
including DNA, and the faithful separation of two daughter
cells. Textbooks use the metaphor of the cycle operating like
a dishwasher performing a series of stereotyped tasks
(Alberts et al. 1994). If quiescence were its default state, it
would be difficult to activate the ‘cell cycle machine’ by
organizing the cell cycle components which entail a very
complex network of constraints. Instead, when proliferation
is the default state, it becomes easier to prevent complex
machinery from functioning: a simple mechanical or chem-
ical constraint may suffice. For example, a switch will do it
for an engine and an inhibitor will do it for a cell. To sum the
situation up, the difference between proliferation or quies-
cence as a default state corresponds to the difference be-
tween preventing something complex from happening and
causing it to happen. The latter is much harder to conceive,
explain and realize.
4.3 The framing principle of biological morphogenesis
Generating phenotypes from a single cell, be it LUCA (Last
Common Universal Ancestor) (Steele and Penny 2010) or a
zygote, is an essential component of phylogenesis and onto-
genesis. Organisms, be they unicellular or multicellular, are a
consequence of the inherent variability generated by prolif-
eration, motility (Sonnenschein and Soto 1999) and self-
organization (Mossio and Moreno 2010), all of which oper-
ate within the framing principle we propose: life phenomena
are non-identical iterations of a morphogenetic process by
which organization is iterated and maintained (table 1). For
example, branching morphogenesis is a ubiquitous process
that generates a repetitive, yet non-identical pattern whereby
length of branches and branching angles vary (figure 3).
The framing principle cannot be derived from the default
state alone. It may be instantiated as autopoiesis16 or more
generally, closure to which variation is added, given that
living autopoietic processes require permanent changes in
their constructing and reconstructing activities (Montévil and
Mossio 2015). Far-from-equilibrium physical processes have
autopoietic characteristics by iterating shapes and physical
16 Autopoietic organization is defined as a unity by a network of
productions of components which (i) participate recursively in the same
network of productions of components which produced these compo-
nents, and (ii) realize the network of productions as a unity in the space
in which the components exist (Varela et al. 1974).
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structures along optimal trajectories. Flames, micelles and
Bénard cells remained unchanged over the last 4 billion
years while evolution generated diverse living forms from
LUCA up to the reader of this page. In our approach, we
Figure 3. Ductal development in whole mounts of mammary glands from C57Bl6 mice illustrates the principle of never identical
iterations on the branching pattern of a ductal system. In Panel A, the arrows point to two mammary gland epithelial structures (buds) at day
15 of embryonic life (E15); the ductal tree emerges from the growth of these buds. Panels B to D show the ductal tree at E19. Arrows
indicate the origin of the ductal tree. Scale bars indicate 100 μm. Panels E and F show mammary trees at post-natal day 21. Scale bars
indicate 500 μm.
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expand the notion of autopoiesis by including in it the
concept of variability. The latter is expressed as theoretical
symmetry changes. By these means we go beyond properties
that could be purely physical since autopoiesis would be
enriched by biological variability and historicity, both asso-
ciated with symmetry changes.
4.4 Complexity versus organization
Oftentimes, organization17 and complexity are considered
synonyms. However, while complexity is mostly meant to
span the material world, including inert and living matter,
organization should be viewed as an exclusive attribute of
life and of machines invented by humans. Complexity and
organization ought to be explicitly defined and distin-
guished. We posit that phenotypic complexity is a quantifi-
able characteristic of static structures as exemplified by the
anatomy of an organism. Complexity can be quantified by
enumerating its components such as the number of cell
types, tissues, organs, organ-connected components, connec-
tions and nodes within networks, fractal dimensions of cells
and organs, etc. (Bailly and Longo 2009; Bizzarri et al.
2011; Longo and Montévil 2014). From the perspective of
the framing principle, instead, organization refers to a dy-
namic state of interdependence of levels that includes both
structures and functions as well as integration and regulation.
Organization cannot happen without complexity, but orga-
nization is not reducible to complexity.
Carcinogenesis illustrates how complexity and organiza-
tion are not equivalent. For instance, in the mammary gland,
precancerous lesions like ductal carcinoma in situ are more
complex than normal ducts. This lesion appears as a partial
occlusion of ducts which results in more than a single lumen.
Multiple lumena indicate higher measurable topological
complexity (figure 4). Moreover, the epithelium-stroma in-
terface has a higher fractal dimension than that of their
normal counterparts (Bizzarri et al. 2011).18 However, a
cancerous tissue is less organized in the sense that it does
not adequately perform the function of the normal tissue of
origin. For example, a blocked duct interferes with excretory
function. Additionally, cells within cancer tissues may not
perform the functions of the cells within the normal tissue of
origin. This combination of higher complexity and lower
organization represents a true hallmark of cancer.
5. Implications for biological research
What are the benefits of adopting the principles for a
theory of organisms delineated above? First, the pro-
posed principles would help to move away from opera-
tional definitions. From the notion of gene to that of
growth factor, the use of operational definitions has
resulted in contradictions and ambiguities that hinder
the establishment of general and stable concepts (Moss
2003; Sonnenschein and Soto 1999). Additionally, the
proposed principles enable alternative explanations to the
mechanistic ones inherent to the molecular biology rev-
olution. The latter do not represent an explicit theoretical
frame, but mostly refer metaphorically to common sense
notions, such as ‘information’ and ‘program’. The use of
these metaphors forces explanations to be molecular and
to follow predictable causal chains (Longo et al. 2012a).
Instead, by insisting on the search of constraints to the
default state, multilevel biomechanical and bioelectrical
explanations become as legitimate as molecular ones.
Second, our principles radically change both observ-
ables and determination vis-à-vis the theoretical frames
proposed by physical theories. Such a change enables us
to anchor reasoning and modelization on robust biolog-
ical principles. Indeed, as implied by Turing, there is an
epistemological gap between modelization and imitation
(Turing 1950, 1952). While the former is based on a
theory concerning the object of knowledge, the latter is
not. For example, individuation becomes the result of
non-identical morphogenetic iterations. This principle ex-
cludes a Platonic conception of ideal or perfect organs
or structures which would be determined as an optimal
solution of an equation.
Third, the principles we propose enable the construction
and discussion of mathematical models on the bases of
biologically relevant assumptions. For example, in ecology
the commonly used equations addressing population size are
not theory-based. Taking into consideration the default state
and the notion of constraint it is feasible to obtain theoreti-
cally meaningful equations in which the food term is not a
cause per se: this constraint becomes relevant only when
there is scarcity of food. In an ecological context there are
numerous parameters that enable the population to grow in
number, however, those parameters actually play a role on
growth (i.e. the growth rate) only when they are limiting the
increase of the population. Food superabundance will not
make the population grow faster.
Fourth, we are proposing an alternative to the use of the
notions of program, information, and signal specificity in
17 The term organization appeared in the early 15th century, in both
English and French; it represents a conflation of ‘to construct’ and
‘organ,’ the musical instrument. Organization became associated with
the meaning of organized living beings in the 18th century. In our
narrative, organization is compatible with the notion of ‘organizational
closure’. The latter is a ‘distinct level of causation, operating in addition
to physical laws, generated by the action of material structures acting as
constraints’ (Mossio and Moreno 2010).
18 ‘Cells within a cancer’ is not synonymous with ‘cancer cells’. When
considering that cancer is a tissue-based disease the phenotype of
individual cells within the cancer tissue is determined by the tissue.
For a detailed explanation, see (Soto and Sonnenschein 2011)
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biology. In particular, biological variation is not noise as in
those information-based theories (Huang 2009). Rather than
as a priori determination as presupposed by the notion of
developmental program, the two proposed principles lead to
a conception of biological specificity that is defined directly
with respect to the trajectory of organisms and their cells in
time and space as a cascade of symmetry changes.
6. Conclusions
Research on organismal biology is being conducted in the
absence of a global theory. Instead, its conceptual frame-
work is loosely based on the mathematical theories of infor-
mation and on operational definitions. This combination of
notions has generated contradictions and hindered progress.
In spite of a few successful outcomes, the application of
physical principles without proper analysis of the differences
between biological and physical situations has also contrib-
uted to the current crisis. Our analysis of the differences
between the physics of inanimate and living matter provides
a sound perspective for the construction of a much needed
theory of organisms while providing founding principles
adequate for framing experiments and mathematical
modelling.
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